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Articles

Admiralty
by Robert S. Glenn, Jr.*
and
Colin A. McRae**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided fourteen
admiralty cases with written opinions in 2000. These cases can
generally be divided into three broad categories: (1) cases involving the
interpretation of federal statutes such as The Americans with Disabilities Act, ("ADA"), the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), the
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Suits in Admiralty Act ("SAA"), The Carriage of Goods By Sea Act
("COGSA"), and the Federal Maritime Lien Act ("FMLA"); (2) cases
involving the interplay of admiralty law and state law in suits involving
claims for attorney fees, the application of laches, and marine insurance
issues; and (3) cases involving traditional maritime issues such as the
interpretation of maritime contracts,. salvage law and sovereign
immunity.
If there is an underlying theme to the Eleventh Circuit's decisions this
year, it would be that they are firmly grounded on precedent and they
are consistent with the majority of other circuit courts that have
addressed the same issues. In that sense, the Eleventh Circuit could be
said to have promoted in 2000 one of the primary goals of the maritime
bar: uniformity in maritime law.
II.

ADMIRALTY LAW AND THE ADA

The Eleventh Circuit had two opportunities to expound upon the
interaction between admiralty law and the ADA.' In Frederick v. Kirby
Tankships, Inc.,2 the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the filing of
an ADA claim, in which a plaintiff alleges to be a "qualified individual"'
fit to perform essential job functions, is inherently inconsistent with a
suit under the Jones Act in which the same plaintiff alleged complete
disability.4 Frederick was a seaman aboard the M/V CHAMPION who
successfully sued the vessel's owner for the injuries he sustained from
a slip and fall while employed on board the vessel.' He alleged these
injuries caused him to be completely disabled and thus unable to work.
Frederick then brought a subsequent lawsuit alleging, among other
things, that he was entitled to damages under the ADA. 6 In order to
bring suit under the ADA, plaintiff must show he is a "qualified
individual" who is fit to perform the essential job functions.7 Kirby
Tankships brought a Rule 60(b)8 motion for relief from judgment in the
Jones Act case because the ADA suit was predicated on the seemingly
contradictory allegation that Mr. Frederick was a qualified individual

1.
2.
3.
4.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
205 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 46 (Oct. 2, 2000).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
205 F.3d at 1282-83.

5. Id. at 1282.
6. Id. at 1288.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
8.

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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who was fit to perform the essential job functions, despite his allegation
in the previous Jones Act case that he was totally disabled.9
The Eleventh Circuit held that Frederick's assertions in his ADA case
that he would be able to work with accommodation were not inconsistent
with his claim of disability in his Jones Act case.'0 The court cited to
an analogous social security case in which the Eleventh Circuit held that
an employee's certification of total disability for the purposes of
obtaining social security benefits does not judicially estop that employee
from also arguing that she is a qualified individual under the ADA.
Therefore, the court concluded that Jones Act cases asserting total
disability are not inherently inconsistent with ADA cases in which the
plaintiff alleges to be a qualified individual who is fit to perform
essential job functions with accommodation. 2
In its next foray into the interplay between admiralty and the ADA,
the Eleventh Circuit was confronted in Stevens v. Premier Cruises,
Inc. 3 with the question of whether the provisions of Title III of the
ADA apply to foreign-flag cruise ships operating in United States
territorial waters.' 4 The Stevens case was brought by a wheelchairbound individual who decided to take a vacation aboard the S.S.
OCEANIC, a Bahamian-flag cruise ship owned by Premiere Cruises.
Upon boarding, she discovered that her cabin and many public areas of
the vessel were not wheelchair-accessible. Stevens brought suit in the
Southern District of Florida, alleging the cruise ship's inaccessibility to
persons in wheelchairs constituted a violation of Title III of the ADA.
The district court dismissed her complaint on the grounds that the ADA
was not applicable to the OCEANIC, and thus her complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.'"
The Eleventh Circuit overturned the dismissal of Stevens' complaint
holding that the provisions of the ADA are applicable to foreign-flag
cruise ships in United States territorial waters." The court reasoned
that cruise ships are places of public accommodation under the ADA
because they contain many of the enumerated examples of public

9. 205 F.3d at 1287-88.
10. Id. at 1288. The court noted in dicta that a dismissal of the subsequent ADA suit,
not the previous Jones Act case, would have been the appropriate course of action in
raising this argument. Id. at 1287.
11. Id. at 1288 (citing Talavera v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214,
1220 (11th Cir. 1997)).
12. Id.
13. 215 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000).
14. Id. at 1242.
15. Id. at 1238-39.
16. Id. at 1242-43.
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accommodations, such as places of lodging, restaurants, bars, theaters,
and auditoriums.17 Premier Cruises argued successfully to the district
court that application of the ADA would conflict with the presumption
against extraterritorial application of United States statutes.' s The
Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument because "a foreign-flag ship
sailing in United States waters is not extraterritorial." 9 Further, the
Eleventh Circuit held that extending the applicability of the ADA to
cruise ships in United States waters would not violate the presumption
against applying United States law to the "internal management and
affairs" of a foreign-flag vessel 2° because the vessel's accessibility to
disabled American passengers does not involve the "internal management and affairs" of the vessel.2 ' The court concluded by comparing
Stevens to Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon," in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld the applicability of the National Prohibition Act
to foreign-flag ships in United States waters.23 The court in Stevens
observed that, as with the ADA, Congress had drawn no distinction in
the National Prohibition Act between domestic and foreign-flag ships
and intended the Act to have a broad reach.24
III.

ADMIRALTY PROCEDURE

In addition to the numerous substantive admiralty law issues
addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in 2000, the court also had occasion
to decide two cases on admiralty procedural grounds. In Beluga
Holding, Ltd. v. Commerce Capital Corp.,25 the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed a case in which a litigant sought to appeal a nonadmiralty
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3), the admiralty interlocutory appeals
section.2'6 This statute gives the Federal Courts of Appeal jurisdiction
over the interlocutory appeal of either an admiralty claim, or a claim
"integrally linked" to an admiralty claim. 7 Beluga Holding involved
an admiralty claim (foreclosure of a ship's mortgage), as well as a non-

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
1990).

Id. at 1240-41 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(F)).
Id. at 1242.
Id.
See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
215 F.3d at 1242.
262 U.S. 100 (1923).
Id. at 131.
215 F.3d at 1242-43.
212 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1200.
Roco Carriers, Ltd. v. MN NURNBERG EXPRESS, 899 F.2d 1292, 1297 (2d Cir.
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admiralty claim (tortious conversion of stock certificates). 8 However,
the court concluded that because these two claims had no common
elements or facts, and because Beluga could prevail on one of them but
not the other, the causes of action were not "integrally linked" for
purposes of establishing appellate jurisdiction over the nonadmiralty
conversion claim.2" Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit had no appellate
jurisdiction over the appeal of the stock certificate conversion claim, and
the court dismissed the appeal."0
The Eleventh Circuit took the opportunity in CoastalFuels Marketing,
Inc. v. Florida Express Shipping Co.3 to clarify when it is appropriate
for a federal court sitting in admiralty to apply substantive state law
from the jurisdiction in which the district court sits. 32 Coastal Fuels
involved the question of which party was entitled to attorney fees in a
marine insurance proceeds dispute in which both sides claimed
victory. 33 The question of when to apply state substantive law is one
with which admiralty courts have often wrestled.34 The court readily
conceded that no federal statutes or general maritime cases provided an
answer. 35 The court concluded that, because this was a question to
which the general maritime law does not provide an answer and this
issue is not one which calls for the creation of a uniform national rule in
admiralty, state law may be applied. 8 The Eleventh Circuit examined
Florida state law to ascertain what standard to use in determining who
is the "prevailing" party for the purposes of recovering attorney fees. 7
Applying standards borrowed from Florida law, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that Florida Express had clearly prevailed on the "significant

28. 212 F.3d at 1202-03.
29. Id. at 1204.
30. Id. at 1205.
31. 207 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2000).
32. Id. at 1251.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). The
general rule in the Eleventh Circuit holds:
One must identify the state law involved and determine whether there is an
admiralty principle with which the state law conflicts, and, if there is no such
admiralty principle, consideration must be given to whether such an admiralty
should be fashioned. If none is to be fashioned, the state rule should be followed.
Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 779 F.2d 1485, 1488 (lth Cir. 1986).
35. 207 F.3d at 1251.
36. Id. (citing Steelmet, Inc., 779 F.2d at 1488).
37. Id. (citing Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., 604 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1992)).
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issue"38 tried before the court, and accordingly upheld the district
court's decision to award them attorney fees. 9
The Eleventh Circuit also heard a case involving the use of the
Supplemental Rule B attachment procedure against corporations owned
by foreign nations. In Venus Lines Agency v. CVG Industria Venezolana
De Aluminio, C.A.4" ("Venus Lines /'), the first of two separate cases
involving these same parties," the issue was whether a contract of
affreightment granting the carrier the "right to attach the cargo for the
payment of the freight" offers a sufficient waiver of immunity under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")" to permit prejudgment
attachment.43 Venus Lines I involved the attachment, under Supplemental Rule B, of aluminum produced by Venalum, an aluminumproducing company controlled primarily by the Venezuelan government." Venalum cited to the FSIA as a bar to this attachment
proceeding on the grounds that the property of a foreign state is immune
from attachment in the United States.45 Venus Lines argued that
Venalum's shipment of aluminum could be attached under an exception
found in Section 1610(d) of the FSIA, which permits attachment if (1)
the foreign state has explicitly waived immunity; (2) the purpose of the
attachment is to obtain security and not to obtain jurisdiction; and (3)
the cargo is being used for a commercial activity in the United States.46
The primary issue facing the Eleventh Circuit in deciding whether to
permit this attachment was whether the contract of affreightment's
language permitting attachment amounted to an explicit waiver of
immunity. 47 The court reviewed the language of the attachment
provision of the contract and decided that the clear reference contained
therein to the "right to attach the cargo" operated as a sufficiently
explicit waiver of immunity under the Section 1610(d) exception. 4 The
court reasoned that the term "attachment" certainly encompasses

38. Id. at 1252; see also Moritz, 604 So. 2d at 810.
39. 207 F.3d at 1252-53.

40.

210 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2000).

41.

See also Venus Lines Agency, Inc. v. CVG Int'l Am., Inc., 234 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir.

2000).
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
43. 210 F.3d at 1310-12.
44. Id. at 1310-11. When a foreign government retains a majority interest in a
corporation, that corporation is considered a "foreign state" under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), (b).
45. 210 F.3d at 1310. See 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
46. 210 F.3d at 1311.
47. Id. at 1311-12.
48. Id.
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"prejudgment attachment," and that language demonstrates a "'clear and
unambiguous intent to waive all claims of immunity in all legal
proceedings.'" 49 Having found this language to be a sufficiently explicit
waiver, the court then turned its attention briefly to the question of
whether this attachment was done to obtain security or to obtain
jurisdiction. 0 Because jurisdiction over Venalum in the United States
was not in dispute (the contract conferred jurisdiction in New York), the
court held that this attachment was undertaken for the purpose of
obtaining security and thus fit under the Section 1610(d) exception.5"
The court stopped short of declaring that attachment was proper in this
case under the exception, however, and remanded the case to the district
court for a factual determination as to whether the commercial activity
prong had been satisfied.52
IV. MARITIME TORTS

A.

Personal Injury

The Eleventh Circuit examined the enforceability of two release
provisions, both of which arose in the context of maritime personal
injury cases. In Shultz v. Florida Keys Dive Center, Inc.," the court
considered a release provision signed by a scuba diving customer that
purported to exculpate the scuba diving company of any liability for
negligence.5 4 In Shultz the estate of Patricia Shultz brought a wrongful
death claim against Florida Keys Dive Center, Inc. after Shultz drowned
while scuba diving. Prior to transporting Shultz out to the dive site,
Florida Keys required her to sign a release form relieving Florida Keys
from any liability for damages sustained by Shultz during the scuba
diving expedition. The district court granted Florida Keys' motion for
summary judgment based on this release. Shultz's estate appealed on
the grounds that this release was invalidated by 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 183c(a), which prohibits passenger vessels from lessening their liability
for their own negligence.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c(a) did not
apply to Florida Keys in this case, and therefore, the release signed by

49. Id. at 1312 (citing Libra Bank, Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 676 F.2d
47, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1982)).
50. Id. at 1312-13.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 1313.
53. 224 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2000).
54. Id. at 1270.
55. Id.
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Shultz was properly enforced by the district court. 6 Section 183c(a)
applies to common carrier vessels transporting passengers between ports
of the United States or between United States and foreign ports.57 The
court acknowledged that there were no federal appellate authorities to
refer to for guidance on this issue, but noted the published district court
and state court opinions have refused to apply Section 183c(a) to releases
in recreational scuba diving cases.5" The court also focused on the
legislative intent behind Section 183c(a), which Congress enacted in
order to put a stop to the steamship lines' practice of putting releases on
the reverse side of passenger tickets. 9 As for plaintiff's further
argument that admiralty common law invalidates these releases, the
court observed the cases cited by plaintiff involved common carriers,
such as ferries, ocean liners, or cruise ships.6" No court had ever relied
upon federal common law to invalidate a liability release for scuba
diving. 6'
As neither Section 183c(a) nor maritime common law
invalidates these releases, the court concluded that the release was
enforceable and summary judgment at the district court level was
62
appropriate.
The court was confronted with a similar provision purporting to limit
liability for negligence in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Sellan.8 Sellan was
a seaman injured in the course of his employment as a cook aboard a
vessel owned by Sea-Land. However, after a previous accident on a
Sea-Land vessel involving plaintiff, the two parties had entered into an
agreement that provided Sellan would never again work nor seek to
procure work aboard a Sea-Land vessel. This agreement further
provided that if, by oversight of Sea-Land, Sellan was able to procure
employment aboard a Sea-Land vessel and was then injured, Sea-Land
would bear no responsibility for his injuries. Sea-Land referred to this
release after Sellan brought suit for back injury sustained in his postrelease employment aboard a Sea-Land vessel, and the district court
judge entered judgment for Sea-Land. Sellan appealed, arguing that

56. Id. at 1271.
57. Id. at 1270 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c(a)).
58. Id. at 1271.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1273.
61. Id. The Shultz opinion expresses skepticism as to whether this incident is even
within the purview of admiralty jurisdiction. The opinion surveys the authorities on each
side of the issue but stops short of deciding whether there is admiralty jurisdiction over
recreational scuba diving accidents in the absence of direct involvement of a boat. Id. at
1272-73.
62. Id.
63. 231 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2000).
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these releases violate the section of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
("FELA")," which renders void any contract intended to enable a
As
common carrier to exempt itself from liability for negligence .6
support for this proposition, the court relied on Babbitt v. Norfolk &
West Railway Co.," which states that a FELA employer's release
"'must reflect a bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific
contrasted with an attempt to extinguish potential future
injury, as
67
claims.'
The court concluded the release signed by Sellan was a settlement of
current injury claims and an attempt to prevent a re-injury to Sellan,
and thus the release did not run afoul of FELA. 6 The court focused on
the fact that the prior settlement between Sea-Land and Sellan was for
a claim of permanent total disability, and "[riefusal to rehire permanently and totally disabled seamen appears to be the only effective means of
both protecting them from further injury and satisfying the employer's
duties."69 Placing the risk of re-injury with Sellan was a permissible
Therefore, the
method of putting "teeth" in such an agreement. 7
district court's reliance on this enforceable release was permitted, and
the judgment for Sea-Land was affirmed."
B.

Property Damage

The Eleventh Circuit also reviewed two tort cases that involved
maritime property damage. The first case, Mid-South Holding Co. v.
United States,72 involved property damage sustained by a vessel during
a search by the United States Customs Service and the United States
Coast Guard ("Customs Service"). The Customs Service was called in to
search the fishing vessel ABNER'S CHOICE on a tip that she was
involved in narcotics trafficking. While the agents discovered no
contraband, they were alleged to have unplugged the vessel's bilge pump
during the search, which caused her to sink the following day. The
vessel owners brought suit against the United States under the Suits in

64. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). In 1920 Congress enacted the Jones Act, which granted
seamen the same rights to sue their employers for personal injuries and death as railway
workers have under FELA. See Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942) (construing 46
U.S.C. § 688).
65. 231 F.3d at 849-51 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 55).
66. 104 F.3d 89 (6th Cir. 1997).
67. 231 F.3d at 852 (quoting Babbitt, 104 F.3d at 93).
68. Id. at 851-53.
69. Id. at 851.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 853.
72. 225 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Admiralty Act ("SAA")7" to recover the value of the lost vessel. The
United States gained summary judgment on the grounds that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the court
concluded the United States enjoyed sovereign immunity in this case.74
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that subject
matter jurisdiction was lacking and held that this case constituted a
"discretionary function" exception to the SAA's waiver of sovereign
immunity.7" The SAA provides an avenue for admiralty claims to be
brought against the United States, for it includes an explicit waiver of
the sovereign immunity of the United States government. 76 There are,
however, certain exceptions to this waiver of sovereign immunity, such
as the "discretionary function" exception from United States v. Gaubert,7 which provides immunity for certain discretionary acts of
government officials. 7s For the discretionary function exception to
apply, the conduct must (1) involve an element of judgment and (2) be
"'susceptible to policy analysis. ' '79
The court concluded that the
applicable federal regulations gave broad discretion to Customs Service
agents and the decision on whether or not to board and search a vessel
involves policy decisions, thereby satisfying the two prongs of the
Gaubert "discretionary function" inquiry."0 Therefore, because this case
represented a discretionary function of the Customs Service, the SAA's
waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply, and thus the district court
correctly held that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over this case.8 '
In Central State Transit & Leasing Corp. v. Jones Boat Yard, Inc.,52
the owner of the BLACKHAWK, a pleasure craft used for business
purposes, sued the owner and the manufacturer of a floating dry dock in
which the BLACKHAWK sustained damages while being repaired. The

73. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (2000).
74. 225 F.3d at 1202-03.
75. Id. at 1203-04.
76. Id. at 1203 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 742).
77. 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
78. 225 F.3d at 1204-05. The United States did not elect to proceed under the
discretionary function exception defense at the district court level but instead chose to
proceed on a law enforcement exception theory borrowed from the Federal Torts Claims
Act ("FTCA"). However, the court of appeals opinion recognized that, unlike the
discretionary function exception from the FTCA, this law enforcement exception has not
been incorporated into the SAA in this circuit. Id. Judge Kravitch exercised judicial
restraint in eschewing the unrecognized law enforcement exception in favor of the fully
recognized discretionary function exception to the SAA in deciding this case.
79. Id. at 1205 (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1207.
82. 206 F.3d 1373 (11th Cir. 2000).
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BLACKHAWK was damaged when the severe listing of the dry dock, a
condition known to both the owner and the manufacturer of the dry
dock, caused the support lines securing the vessel to snap, and as a
result, she tumbled over off of the block supporting the keel. The vessel
owner sought to recover the amount of physical damage sustained by the
vessel, as well as damages for loss of use of the BLACKHAWK. The
district court found that the manufacturer and owner of the dry dock
were negligent and that the negligence "operated in concert" to cause
injury to the vessel in the amount of $125,000. The district court
apportioned seventy-five percent of the fault for these damages to the
manufacturer of the dry dock, and twenty-five percent to the dry dock
owner.8 3 The district court refused, however, to award any damages for
loss of use of this pleasure vessel.8 4
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the apportionment of
damages and the refusal to award loss of use damages."5 The boat yard
owner had argued that the "proportionate share" s rule of liability
apportionment was not applicable in this case because the manufacturer
was sued in tort while the owner was sued in contract.8 " The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the proportionate share rule was applicable
because the owner and manufacturer had operated in concert to cause
a single injury to the vessel and because the manufacturer had settled
its liability with the appellee."8 Furthermore, the court acknowledged
that loss of use damages are available for pleasure craft " but cautioned
that those damages are awarded only when profits have actually been
lost and the amount of the profits is proven with reasonable certainty.9"
Because the corporate clients that used the BLACKHAWK continued to
pay fees even during her repair, no actual loss of profits could be proven,
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of loss of use
damages."

83. Id. at 1374-75. Before trial the appellant settled all its claims against Conrad, the
manufacturer of the dry dock, for $150,000. Id. at 1375.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1377.
86. Id. The "proportionate share" rule holds that, when one joint tortfeasor has settled,
the nonsettling joint tortfeasor's liability should be assessed on the basis of that tortfeasor's
proportionate share. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 210 (1994).
87. 206 F.3d at 1377.
88. Id. (citing Jovovich v. Desco Marine, Inc., 809 F.2d 1529, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987)).
89. Id. at 1376. See The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110 (1897).
90. 206 F.3d at 1376 (citing The Conqueror, 166 U.S. at 125).
91. Id. at 1376-77.
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MARITIME CONTRACTS

The Eleventh Circuit took the opportunity in Venus Lines Agency, Inc.
v. CVG InternationalAmerica, Inc., ("Venus Lines IIP"92 to clarify when
maritime breach of contract claims are time barred.93 Venus Lines
Agency, Inc. ("Venus") brought suit in 1998 to recover demurrage9 4
dating back to 1995, 1996, and 1997."s The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding that the 1995 and 1996 demurrage claims
were time barred under the doctrine of laches, the principle by which
most admiralty claims are reviewed.'
In determining whether a
party's delay in bringing a claim should bar the suit, admiralty courts
look to the analogous state statute of limitations as a benchmark. s
When the plaintiff files its admiralty claim within the analogous
statutory period, the burden shifts to the defendant to show "'inexcusable delay'" and "'resulting prejudice"' in order to establish a laches
defense.98
In Venus Lines II, Venus filed its demurrage claims within Florida's
analogous four-year statute of limitations for oral contracts. Therefore,
CVG had to show "inexcusable delay" and "resulting prejudice" in order
to have these claims dismissed as time barred. CVG showed that Venus
had failed to demand payment from CVG for the 1995 and 1996
demurrage claims until filing the lawsuit in 1998, which constituted
inexcusable and prejudicial delay.99 The court found prejudice because
of the fact that CVG could have sought payment for the demurrage from
the consignees of the cargo if timely presuit demand for payment had
been made by Venus.' °
Therefore, the 1995 and 1996 demurrage
charges were barred by the doctrine of laches despite having been filed
within the analogous four-year statute of limitations in Florida for
disputes concerning oral contracts.1 The Eleventh Circuit held

92.

234 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000). This is the second of two cases heard by the

Eleventh Circuit involving these same two parties.

93. Id. at 1227.
94. Demurrage is compensation to the owners of a ship for the detention of their
vessel beyond the permitted number of days for loading and unloading of cargo. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 432 (6th ed. 1990).
95. 234 F.3d at 1227-28.
96. Id. at 1231.
97. Id. at 1230.
98. Id. (quoting Mecom v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 622 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir.
1980)).

99. Id. at 1230-31.
100. Id. at 1231.
101.

Id.
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further that the 1997 demurrage claim was not time barred under the
upon
doctrine of laches because demanding payment for a 1997 claim
°2
filing suit in 1998 did not inexcusably delay or prejudice CVG.
VI.

MARINE INSURANCE

In HIH Marine Services, Inc. v. Fraser,"3 the first of its two marine

insurance cases, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its adherence to the
strict rule of uberrimae fidei, or "utmost good faith," under which a
material misrepresentation on a marine insurance application will
render any policy procured void ab initio.1 ° HIH Marine Services, Inc.
("HIH Marine") agreed to provide hull insurance for the M/V NETAN-EL
pursuant to a request by Mobay Underseas Tours, Ltd. ("Mobay") that
the vessel be added to Mobay's existing policy. As part of Mobay's
application for the endorsement covering the NETAN-EL, Mobay
represented to HIH Marine that Mobay had a charter agreement in
place with the vessel's owners, Roger Fraser and Shalom Enterprises,
Ltd. In addition, Mobay purported to have custody of the NETAN-EL
pursuant to this chartering agreement. However, these representations
were untrue, for the proposed charter agreement was never executed and
Mobay was never given custody of the vessel. After a fire broke out on
the NETAN-EL, leading to her total destruction, HIH Marine discovered
that no final charter agreement was in place and that Mobay had not
had custody of the vessel. HIH Marine accordingly denied coverage.
The district court found these representations to be material and voided
the policy under the doctrine of uberrimae fidei.0 5
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment, concluding that the district court had properly applied the
uberrimae fidei standard in voiding this endorsement to the hull
policy."° The court ruled that material misrepresentations are those
that "'might have a bearing on the risk to be assumed by the insurer.'" 10 7 Moreover, an applicant's duty to disclose extends even to those
The Elevmaterial facts not directly inquired into by the insurer.'

102. Id.
103. 211 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2000).
104. Id. at 1361-63 (citing CIGNA Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Polaris Pictures Corp.,
159 F.3d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1998)).
105. Id. at 1361-62.
106. Id. at 1364.
107. Id. at 1363 (quoting Northfield Ins. Co. v. Barlow, 983 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (N.D,
Fla. 1997)).
108. Id. at 1362-63 (citing Jackson v. Leads Diamond Corp., 767 F. Supp. 268,271 (S.D.
Fla. 1991)).
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enth Circuit reasoned that the insurer should have the right to assess
the risk using accurate information on the identity of the insured and
the use of the vessel.109 The court further reasoned that an applicant's
opinion as to what is material to the insurer's decision is irrelevant. °
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment declaring the marine insurance endorsement void ab
initio.111

The Eleventh Circuit's next marine insurance case, All Underwriters
v. Weisberg,"2 involved the question of how to determine an attorney
fees award in the marine insurance context.1 3 The dispute in Weisberg over attorney fees arose out of a declaratory judgment action filed
by certain underwriters who sought to have a marine insurance policy
declared void ab initio due to alleged misrepresentations. The underwriters' motion for summary judgment was denied, and the parties settled
the claim for the full loss amount, with the vessel owners reserving the
right to appeal the attorney fees issue.1 4 The Eleventh Circuit
referred to Coastal Fuels Marketing, Inc. v. Florida Express Shipping
Co." 5 in concluding that this specific question was one for which
maritime law does not provide an answer and was not an area in which
a uniform maritime law need be fashioned." 6 The court concluded
that the applicable Florida state statute on attorney fees in insurance
disputes should be used in deciding the question." 7 The Eleventh
Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to determine the
attorney fee question under the applicable Florida statute.",
This holding aligns the Eleventh Circuit with the Fifth Circuit on this
question but directly contrasts with Second Circuit decisions."19 In
INA of Texas v. Richard,2 ' the Fifth Circuit arrived at the same
conclusion as the Eleventh Circuit, holding that "there is no specific and
controlling federal rule of law relating to attorney's fees in maritime
insurance litigation." 2 ' However, in American National Fire Insur-

109.
110.
ill.
112.
113.
114.
116.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1363-64.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
222 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. dismissed, 121 S. Ct. 674 (Dec. 28, 2000).
Id. at 1310.
Id.
207 F.3d 1247 (lth Cir. 2000). See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
222 F.3d at 1312.
Id. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1314-15.
800 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1381.
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ance Co. v. Kenealy,'22 the Second Circuit has held that there exists an
established federal maritime law that prohibits attorney fees in marine
insurance contract disputes.123 In light of this disagreement between
the circuits, the court in Weisberg carefully analyzed the authority cited
by each circuit court before rendering its own opinion on the issue.'24
The court in Weisberg ultimately concluded that the Kenealy opinion
from the Second Circuit was wrongly decided. 25 The two cases cited
in Kenealy for the proposition that maritime law prohibits attorney fees
were cases involving maritime tort actions, not maritime insurance
contract disputes.126 In fact, the First Circuit opinion cited in Kenealy
supports the proposition that maritime law does not cover marine
insurance contract disputes.127 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit chose
to side with the Fifth Circuit in concluding that federal maritime law
does not provide an answer to the question of how to determine attorney
fees in maritime insurance litigation, and thus the state law of the
jurisdiction where the district court sits is the appropriate law to
consider.12
VII.

CARGO

In its only case of the year involving the Carriage of Goods by Seas
Act ("COGSA"), 129 Polo Ralph Lauren, L.P v. Tropical Shipping &
Construction Co.,' 3 ° the Eleventh Circuit decided two important
questions: (1) whether the owner of a shipment of cargo may sue under
a bill of lading in which that owner is not named and (2) whether that
owner's alternative tort or bailment theories of recovery are preempted
by COGSA."' Polo had entered into a bailment contract with Drusco,
Inc. for the manufacture of men's pants in the Dominican Republic. Part
of this arrangement required Drusco to enter into a contract of carriage
with Tropical Shipping Construction Co. ("Tropical") to transport Polo's
raw fabric from the United States before manufacture and deliver the
finished products to the United States after manufacture. The container

122. 72 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1995).
123. Id. at 270.
124. 222 F.3d at 1314.
125. Id.
126. Id. (analyzing Sosebee v. Rath, 893 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1990); Southworth Mach. Co.
v. FN COREY PRIDE, 994 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1993)).
127. Id. "'ITihe refusal to settle [insurance] claims is normally left untouched by
maritime law.'" Id. (quoting Southworth Mach. Co., 994 F.2d at 41).
128. Id. at 1314-15.
129. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (2000).
130. 215 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).

131. Id. at 1219.
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carrying the finished Polo cargo was lost overboard due to rough seas
encountered during the voyage from the Dominican Republic to the
United States. Polo then filed this suit seeking damages under
bailment, negligence, and contract theories, despite the fact that Polo's
name appeared nowhere on the applicable bill of lading. The district
court entered
summary judgment for Tropical Shipping on all
132
counts.
The Eleventh Circuit began by upholding summary judgment on Polo's
bailment and negligence claims on the theory that they were preempted
by COGSA. 13 3 The court acknowledged that COGSA claims are hybrid
in nature, drawing on elements of both contract and tort.'
However,
COGSA was promulgated with the intent of offering one unified
statutory remedy, and other claims predicated on negligence or other
theories of recovery are therefore preempted."' Tropical then argued
that Polo's COGSA claim should also be eliminated because Polo's name
did not appear anywhere on the bill of lading for this shipment. 36 The
court disagreed, noting that the bill of lading referred to the "owner of
the goods" as a party to the bill of lading and that there was sufficient
evidence that Polo indeed owned the cargo." '7 Therefore, Polo did not
as a matter of law lack standing to sue on the bill of lading, and the
Eleventh Circuit overturned the granting of summary judgment by the
district court, remanding the case for trial on the COGSA claim
alone. 38
VIII.

SALVAGE

International Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Aircraft3 9 presented several issues regarding the salvage
of property owned by the United States government. While searching
the ocean depths for sunken Spanish galleons, International Aircraft
Recovery, L.L.C. ("JAR") discovered the remains of a United States Navy
Devastator TBD-1 torpedo bomber that had crashed off the coast of
Florida during training exercises in 1943. IAR attempted on two
occasions to raise the wreckage of the rare World War II-era aircraft,

132. Id.
133. Id. at 1221.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1220-21.
136. Id. at 1221.
137. Id. at 1223.
138. Id. at 1225.
139. 218 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, International Aircraft Recovery v.
United States, 121 S. Ct. 1079 (Feb. 20, 2001).
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despite the Navy's objections. IAR responded by filing an injunction in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
seeking to bar any interference by the Navy with IAR's future recovery
efforts, arguing that it had title to the aircraft under the law of finds
because the Navy had long since abandoned the aircraft. In the
alternative, IAR argued that it should receive a full and liberal award
for salvage services already performed. The district court granted IAR's
motion for summary judgment on its injunction claim and held further
that LAR would be entitled to a salvage award. 4 '
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court order permitting IAR
to continue salvage operations on the Devastator."' Furthermore, the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with IAR's abandonment argument and
declined to vest title to the aircraft in IAR.'42 The court rejected IAR's
argument that the Navy's striking of the plane from its inventory of
active planes amounted to abandonment of all interest in the plane,
especially in light of the fact that the federal government cannot
abandon property absent an affirmative act of Congress.143 Moreover,
a Navy circular from one year after the crash expressly contemplated
salvage operations after striking lost aircraft from the Navy's active duty
list.'"
Despite rejecting IAR's law of finds argument and reversing the
injunction permitting IAR to salvage the plane, the court held that IAR
may be entitled to an award for salvage operations carried out prior to
the Navy's objection to those services and remanded the case to the
45
district court to determine the amount of the salvage award, if any.'
The court reasoned that, while the owner of imperiled property may
reject a salvor's assistance, if the rejection comes after substantial efforts
have been undertaken, the salvor may be eligible for a salvage
award.' 4
The court pointed in particular to ongoing negotiations
between the Navy and IAR over the post salvage fate of the vintage
aircraft as a possible acquiescence to the salvage efforts, thereby
necessitating a remand to the district court for a determination as to
when the salvage efforts were 7 effectively rejected so that a salvage
4
award, if any, could be affixed.'

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1256-57.
1264.
1259-60.
1258-59 (citing Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941)).
1259.
1263-64.
1262-63.
1263-64.
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MARITIME LIENS

ContainerApplicationsInternational,Inc. v. Lykes Brothers Steamship
Co.

148

concerned the emerging debate as to whether a company that

a
leases containers in bulk to a steamship line "provides necessaries to 49
vessel" for the purposes of the Federal Maritime Lien Act ("FMLA").1
The FMLA provides that a company providing necessaries to a vessel
may pursue a maritime lien against the vessel if the vessel owner fails
to pay for the necessaries.150 While both parties conceded that containers constitute necessaries under the FMLA, there was a dispute as to
whether Container Applications International ("CAI") had "provided
necessaries" within the meaning of the statute when it leased containers
in bulk to Lykes Brothers without any specific reference to any
The Eleventh Circuit aligned itself with the
particular vessels.''
other four circuits that had ruled on this issue by holding that the bulk
leasing of containers to shipping companies who then decide when,
where, and how to use the containers does not constitute the "providing
of necessaries" for the purposes of the FMLA." 2
The Eleventh Circuit examined the analogous United States Supreme
Court case of Piedmont & George's Creek Coal Co. v. SeaboardFisheries
Co.'63 before arriving at this conclusion. '1 4 In Piedmont a coal dealer
supplied coal to an oil company for use on its fleet of fishing vessels
without designating any particular vessel to receive the coal. The coal
supplied in Piedmont was intermingled with other suppliers' coal in bins
at the purchaser's facility prior to use at either the factory or on the
5
The Supreme Court held that the coal
purchaser's fleet of vessels."'
supplier had not provided coal pursuant to the meaning of the FMLA,
and the Court therefore disallowed any lien.' 56 In response to the

148.

233 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2000).

149. 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2000).
150. Id. § 31342(a).
151. 233 F.3d at 1363. For a maritime lien to arise under the FMLA, there must
usually be a direct connection between the provider of the necessaries and a specific vessel.
Jeffrey v. Henderson Bros., 193 F.2d 589, 593-94 (4th Cir. 1951).
152. 233 F.3d at 1363 (citing Silver Star Enters. v. Saramacca MV, 82 F.3d 666 (5th
Cir. 1996); Redcliffe Ars., Ltd. v. M/V TYSON LYKES, 996 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1993); Itel
Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv., Ltd., 982 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1992); Foss

Launch & Tug Co. v. Char Ching Shipping U.S.A. Ltd., 808 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1987).
153. 25 U.S. 1 (1920).
154. 233 F.3d at 1363-66.
155. 25 U.S. at 6-7.
156. Id. at 13. The previous iterations of the FMLA used the term "furnishing" in place
of "providing" in today's version of the statute, but nothing suggests that the word change
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argument that the Piedmont decision should not be extended from the
clumsy transaction of coal supply to the mature industry of container
supply, Judge Pollak reasoned in his concurrence that it is up to
Congress to change the FMLA if an individual industry, such as
container suppliers, is to receive special dispensation." 7

is significant to the issue in ContainerApplications International,Inc. 233 F.3d at 1363 n.2.
157. Id. at 1367 (Pollak, J., concurring).
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